We give a theoretical model of conjunctions E ∧ F and implications E ⇒ F where F is meaningful only when E is true, a situation which is very often encountered in everyday mathematics, and which was already formalized by several type theorists. We present a version of these concepts which should be more attractive for mathematicians and in particular for non logicians, by using an extension of Lawvere's definition of the quantifiers. We explain the link of this phenomenon with the principle of description, why this dependency is obtained through the use of a "hidden" variable, and more generally the link of these concepts with the vernacular language of mathematics, which is actually our main motivation. Despite its links with topos theory, this article is readable by non specialists.
Introduction
The conjunction, also known as the "logical and", and widely denoted ∧, is generally defined as a commutative operation. In other words, for any statements E and F , it is assumed (or proved) that E ∧ F is equivalent to F ∧ E.
However, there are very elementary and simple examples showing that this is not always the case. For example, let A be a subset of the set N of the natural integers, and consider the statement A = ∅ ∧ inf(A) = 0, where inf(A) denotes the infimum (greatest lower bound) of A. This statement is clearly correct (i.e. meaningful), should it be true or not. On the contrary, the statement inf(A) = 0 ∧ A = ∅ is incorrect, because inf(A) is not meaningful if we don't know that A is nonempty. Notice that similarly, A = ∅ ⇒ inf(A) = 0 is correct and inf(A) = 0 ⇒ A = ∅ incorrect for the same reason.
It is hard to find a treatement of this problem in the literature. It seems that the first occurrence of a theoretic analysis of this fact can be found in a series of lectures given by P. Martin-Löf in 1980 (see [6] ), within the setting of what he calls "intuitionistic type theory". The idea is mainly based on the fact that statements can be identified with sets (or types) in view of the analogy between the two situations : "the element a is of type X" and "the expression p is a proof of the statement E", which is now widely popularized under the name of "Curry-Howard correspondance", to which Martin-Löf actually also refers. Subsequent works have appeared modelizing these "dependent logical connectors", such as T. Coquand and G. Huet in 1986 [1] (see also M. Hyland and A. M. Pitts [3] ), or D. Pavlović [7] in 1990, among others.
We will not say more about type theory, and we turn now to a vocabulary which is more familiar to mathematicians. We propose an explanation of the dependent conjunction and implication, which is not only a modelization of them, but also shows how much their existence is natural. It is indeed exactly as natural as the existence of the quantifiers ∃ and ∀, simply because the dependent conjunction and implication play the same role with respect to assumptions as the quantifiers with respect to declarations. It seems to us that the best way to understand this is to use one of the most beautiful discoveries of William Lawvere, namely his definition of the quantifiers by way of adjoint increasing maps.
(
1 )
It appears that a dependent conjunction E ∧ F (and similarly for an implication) must be denoted (ζ ⊢ E)∧F if we want to be completely explicit, where ζ ⊢ E is a kind of declaration of ζ (actually a named assumption) and where F contains free occurrences of the variable ζ. Of course, in usual mathematics, this variable ζ is not visible, and we also explain on the one hand how F can have such a free occurrence of ζ, and on the other hand why ζ remains invisible (hidden) in F , and consequently not explicitly declared in front of E.
The content of this article is valid for both intuitionnistic and classical mathematics, and is part of the type theory and topos theory more or less explicit folklore. We hope to add some originality in the way we have chosen to present it, and to make the subject accessible to a wider audience.
Prerequisites
The meaning of logical connectors was historically defined in two different ways : the "logical" one, which defines under which conditions a given statement is true (or false), possibly using truth tables (in other words, how to compute a truth value for a statement), and the "operational" one, which defines the meaning of logical connectors in terms of proofs. The second manner was initiated around 1930 by the intuitionnists (and is also valid for classical logic( 2 )) through the so-called Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, and also by G. Gentzen in his work on natural deduction and sequent calculus. This operational point of view was more recently very elegantly reformulated using the categorical concept of adjoint functors (in the present case, adjoint increasing maps), in particular within the setting of topos theory.
For example, the (ordinary) conjunction can be defined as the right adjoint to the duplication (diagonal) operation. In order to see this, consider two preordered sets X and Y ,(
3 ) and two maps f : X → Y and g : Y → X. We say that "f is left adjoint to g" (or equivalently that "g is right adjoint to f ") if :
This fact is denoted f ⊣ g.( 4 ) This definition has several elementary consequences. First of all, the inequality x ≤ g(f (x)) is true for any x in X (just replace y by f (x) in the above statement, and use the reflexivity of the preorder relation). Symmetrically, we have f (g(y)) ≤ y for any y in Y . These two inequalities are known as the "unit" and the "co-unit" of the adjonction f ⊣ g. From this and the transitivity of preorder relations we can deduce that f and g are increasing functions, and that if we have f ⊣ g and f ⊣ h, then g and h are "equivalent" in the sens that for any y in Y , we have g(y) ≤ h(y) and h(y) ≤ g(y) (so that they are actually equal if the preorder on X is an order). Of course we also have the symmetric fact that f ⊣ h and g ⊣ h entail that f and g are equivalent. Furthermore, if f ⊣ h and g ⊣ k, and if g • f is meaningful, then h • k is also meaningful and we have g •f ⊣ h•k. Finally, we will also need the fact that left adjoints commute (up to equivalence) with least upper bounds, and that right adjoints commute (up to equivalence) with greatest lower bounds.( 5 ) We leave these facts as easy exercices for the reader.
Hence, if a map has an adjoint (either on the left or on the right), this adjoint is essentially (i.e. up to equivalence) unique. As a consequence, if a map is defined as a left or right adjoint to a given map, it is well defined (up to equivalence).( 6 ) This kind of definition is a particular case of a "universal problem". Now, consider the meta-set E of all mathematical (closed) statements. This meta-set is preordered by the relation of deductibility, that we denote ≤ in this article. In other words, E ≤ F means that F can be deduced from E (i.e. proved under hypothesis E). This is clearly a preorder.( 7 ) For any preordered set X, the product set X × X is also preordered by the relation defined by the condition that (x, y) ≤ (u, v) if and only if x ≤ u and y ≤ v, and we have a "diagonal" (or "duplication") map ∆ : X → X × X defined by ∆(x) = (x, x) (which is obviously increasing). Now, we can define a map ∧ : E × E → E just by postulating that ∆ ⊣ ∧. The map ∧ is well defined (up to provable equivalence of statements). It is easy to recognize that this map cannot be anything else than our usual conjunction. This is just a consequence of the fact that the usual conjunction indeed has the property ∆ ⊣ ∧, since we have :
This definition (which is well known in topos theory) of the conjunction is one of the last known avatars of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation (concerning the conjunction). It is undoubtly the most elegant thing we can do for defining the (ordinary) conjunction.
Why is such a definition "operational" ? This is just because all the proof rules concerning the conjunction can be deduced from it, which is not the case if the conjunction is defined by the "logical" method, i.e. in terms of truth values. Indeed, the adjonction ∆ ⊣ ∧ means that E ≤ F ∧ G if and only if E ≤ F and E ≤ G, in other words that it is equivalent to prove F ∧ G under the hypothesis E, or to prove separately F and then G under the same hypothesis. This is of course a rule that anyone uses everyday when a conjunction must be proved. Now, consider the co-unit of the adjonction, which writes :
which gives the rules E ∧ F ≤ E and E ∧ F ≤ F (which are generally taken as axioms in most presentations of the properties of the conjunction). The reader is urged to check that we have similarly ∨ ⊣ ∆, and that the principle of "reasoning by disjunction of cases" is actually a consequence of this definition. ( 8 ) Actually, E ∧ F is nothing else than the greatest lower bound of E and F , as is the case of any concept defined as the right adjoint of a diagonal map (as for example the gcd using the divisibility relation, or the intersection using the inclusion of subsets relation). However, the notion of adjoint maps is much more general than the notion of greatest lower 7 But not an order, because we are very careful not to confuse statements (which are "signifiers", a syntactic notion) with truth values (the corresponding "signified", a semantic notion).
8 It should be remarqued that there is no dependent disjunction in mathematics. Indeed, a disjunction E ∨ F should be true if E is false and F true. But in this case, F cannot depend on the truth of E.
bound. Of course, the commutativity of the (ordinary) conjunction is a consequence of the commutativity of the diagonal ∆.
Because we will use it in another section below, we also recall the definition of the usual implication via adjunctions. Given a statement F , we consider the map E → E ∧ F from E to E. By definition, the map G → F ⇒ G is a right adjoint to the previous one. In other words, we have :
This means that in order to prove the implication F ⇒ G under the hypothesis E it is enough to prove G under the hypothesis E ∧ F . This is of course what everyone does when an implication must be proved, and is known as the "auxiliary hypothesis method".
The co-unit of this adjunction writes :
which is the principle known as "modus ponens".
Another advantage of this method, is that it gives a clear and exciting definition of the quantifiers, as was revealed by Lawvere.
Lawvere's definition of the quantifiers
In order to express Lawvere's definition of the quantifiers, we must first discuss the notion of "context". In mathematical texts, it is often the case that we "declare" variables. For example, we can say "Let x be a real number.". Such a sentence is called a "declaration". In this article, a "generic" declaration will be denoted (x ∈ X), where x is a symbol and where X is a set.
Within any part of a mathematical text, we are "working in a context", which is just the consequence of the declarations made so far.( 10 ) Let Γ denote an arbitrary context, and let Γ(x ∈ X) denote the context obtained by declaring x as an element of X in the context Γ. In other words, Γ(x ∈ X) is the context obtained by "enriching" Γ by a new declaration.( 11 ) We ask that a variable cannot be declared twice in the same context. In other words, the context Γ(x ∈ X) is invalid if x is already declared in Γ.
We also denote by E Γ the meta-set of all statements which are meaningful in the context Γ, in other words, the free variables of which are declared in Γ. This meta-set E Γ is still preordered by the deductibility relation, that we denote ≤ Γ . There is a canonical inclusion J x∈X : E Γ → E Γ(x∈X) , since if a free variable in a statement E is declared in Γ, it is a fortiori declared in Γ(x ∈ X). Notice the importance of the fact that a variable cannot be declared twice in the same context. Indeed, if a variable x is already declared as an element of some set Y in Γ, it can be the case that a statement E which is meaningful in Γ becomes meaningless in Γ(x ∈ X). This phenomenon is analogous to the well known "capture of variable".
Since J x∈X is a canonical inclusion, any statement E is identical to J x∈X (E) from the syntactic viewpoint. However, it is in many places very important to still see this operator J x∈X . This is why, instead of writing J x∈X (E) as E, we write it grey tint : J x∈X (E). Now, if a is any expression representing an element of X in the context Γ, and if E ∈ E Γ(x∈X) , the process of replacing all (free) occurrences of x in E by the expression a produces a statement interpretable (i.e. meaningful) in the context Γ, in other words, an element of E Γ , that we denote by E[a/x] (read "E where a replaces x"). Hence, we have a map [a/x] : E Γ(x∈X) → E Γ (for each such a), and it is clear that this map is a retraction for
because the replacement can also be performed within proofs. ( 12 ) Lawvere defines the quantifiers by postulating that :
Let's check that our "usual" quantifiers have this property, so that they are actually equivalent to Lawvere's quantifiers. In the case of the universal quantifier, Lawvere's definition writes :
We do not give any precise definition of the replacement. We assume only that it is a retraction for J x∈X and that it is increasing. These two properties are of course easy consequences of the "usual" definition of the replacement, and of the definition of proofs (that we don't explicitly need here).
Important warning : The inclusion J x∈X : E Γ → E Γ(x∈T ) allows to identify E Γ to a subset of E Γ(x∈X) , but not as a preordered subset. Indeed, we can have J x∈X (E) ≤ Γ(x∈X) J x∈X (F ), and not have E ≤ Γ F , because the fact of declaring x in X can allow to prove things which are not provable in the context Γ. Think for example of what happens if you declare an element in the empty set.
13 Maybe the word "defines" needs an explanation. The reality is that such adjonctions can be used to define the deductibility relation itself, and this provides a meaning for the logical connectors as a by-product. See [9] Chapitre 1, for a detailed explanation of this fact. Lawvere did not actually give the definition exactly in this form. His "definition" (or more accurately, his characterization) looks much more in the form of a pair of internal (in the sens of the "internal logic" of topos theory) adjoints to the "inverse image" arrow P(Y ) → P(X) (for a given arrow X → Y ), where P(X) and P(Y ) are seen as "internally ordered objects". There is also an "external" version of this using Sub (the subobject functor) instead of P (the power object functor). In some sens, Lawvere's actual definition uses subsets where we are using statements, but this is of course equivalent in view of the one-to-one correspondance between subobjects (or subsets) and characteristic arrows. See Lawvere [5] .
What this says is that in order to prove ∀ x∈X F under the hypothesis E, we can just declare x in X and prove F under this same hypothesis E (and that the converse is also true). This is clearly what we do everyday.
The co-unit of the adjunction writes :
which is the most general case of particularization of a universally quantified statement. It says that if ∀ x∈X F is true, then F is true, provided of course that we interpert this in the context Γ(x ∈ X) (otherwise, F would be anyway meaningless). Applying the replacement map [a/x] to both sides, we get :
which is the "usual" particularization principle.
A symmetric analysis can be done for the existential quantifier. Precisely, the adjunction writes :
This shows how to use an existence hypothesis. Indeed, in order to prove F under the hypothesis ∃ x∈X E, we can first declare x ∈ X, and then prove F under the hypothesis E. This is again what everybody does instinctively. Applying the replacement [a/x] to the unit of the adjunction yields :
which is the usual "exhibition principle" used for proving an existence.
The dependent conjunction and implication
We now arrive at the heart of our subject. Contexts are constructed not only via declarations, but also via "assumptions". For example, we can find the following sentence within a mathematical text : "Let x be a real number, and assume that x > 0.", i.e. a declaration followed by an assumption. Obviously, both are modifying the context in the intuitive sens, simply because they both provide new means for proving.
Let's use the notation ζ ⊢ E (read "ζ proves E ") for a generic assumption, where E is a statement, and ζ the "name" of the assumption. As previously with declarations, we consider contexts of the form Γ(ζ ⊢ E) obtained by enriching Γ by the "assumption" ζ ⊢ E,( 14 ) and we have a canonical inclusion J ζ ⊢E :
Imitating Lawvere, we introduce, for any statement E, two "declarative operators",
which are actually two maps from E Γ(ζ ⊢E) to E Γ , by postulating :
Before proving anything from this definition, we must capture the fact that E is true in the context Γ(ζ ⊢ E) (and even a little more than this). Nothing up to here can entail this fact, because there is a priori no link between the deductibility relation and the concept represented by the sign ⊢, which actually has no precise meaning up to now, and is mainly just a syntactic gadget. In other words, we must state a principle which establishes the link between "deductibility" and "assumption". We propose the following special rule :
(where ∧ is the ordinary conjunction) which says that it is the same thing to deduce G from E ∧ F or to deduce G from F alone after having assumed E. It is actually the formalisation of the difference refered to in footnote 9.
Now, let's examine the consequences of the above definition. Concerning the right adjoint (the "dependent implication") we have the equivalence :
This means that proving the implication (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ G under the hypothesis F is the same as proving G under the same hypothesis F , but after having assumed E. This is clearly the same thing as the usual "auxiliary hypothesis method",( 17 ) and this just shows that this method is compatible with the dependency of G on the truth of E. E (ζ).", where ζ is a symbol (a name) by which we can later refer to this assumption. The reason why assumptions are generally anonymous is a consequence of a fundamental principle of mathematics, the "indiscernibility of proofs" (also called "proof-irrelevance"), which is discussed in section 7. For our explanations, we need to be explicit, hence the notation ζ ⊢ E. Furthermore, if p is any proof of E in the context Γ, the replacement operation [p/ζ] : E Γ(ζ ⊢E) → E Γ is a retraction for J ζ ⊢E and is increasing. In this article, we don't give any precise definition of the notion of proof. This is not necessary for our purpose, and we will actually not use this kind of replacement.
16 A similar rule exists in Gentzen's work (left ∧-rule), which establishes the link between the conjunction and the coma in the left members of sequents. This coma may be considered as an external version of the conjunction, and indeed, concatanation of assumptions in a context is also a kind of "external" conjunction. From this special rule, we can derive the rule : H ≤ Γ(ζ ⊢E) J ζ ⊢E (E) for any statement E meaningful in Γ and any statement H meaningful in Γ(ζ ⊢ E). Indeed, it is enough to replace F by ⊤ (a greatest element in E Γ ), and G by E in the special rule, and to use the facts that E ∧ ⊤ ≃ E and that H ≤ Γ(ζ ⊢E) ⊤ ≃ J ζ ⊢E (⊤), because indeed, J ζ ⊢E , as a right adjoint, preserves greatest elements which are the greatest lower bounds of the empty subset. This derived rule just says that if you assume E, then E is true.
17 And here, we are much closer to the usual meaning of this method than in the introduction. See footnote 9.
Notice that the co-unit of this adjunction writes :
which means that if you have the hypothesis (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ G in a context where E is assumed, you can deduce G. This is the most general dependent version of "modus ponens". There is no hope to have exactly the form (E ⇒ G) ∧ E ≤ G because the left hand side should be interpretable in a context not declaring ζ, where G is not meaningful (because it depends on ζ).( 18 ) However, we have the following inequality :
by the co-unit of the adjunction (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ ⊣ J ζ ⊢E , and since J ζ ⊢E is increasing, we have :
by the co-unit of the other adjunction. We will show in section 4 that
where ∧ is the ordinary conjunction), so that we also have the simplified form :
which is probably the formulation which is the closest possible to the ordinary modus ponens.
Concerning the left adjoint (the "dependent conjunction") we have the equivalence :
which means that in order to use the hypothesis (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F in order to prove G, we can just use only the hypothesis F , but after having assumed E. This is again indeed what we do daily in a natural and instinctive way.
The unit of this adjunction writes :
which means that (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F can be deduced from F , provided that E is assumed, which is again an everyday proof method (actually, the canonical way for proving a dependent conjunction).
Notice that the non dependent counterpart of this last fact is just the fact that in order to prove E ∧ F under some hypothesis, we can prove E and then F under the same hypothesis. In the dependent situation this works similarly except that E must be proved first, because the fact that E is true is necessary to make F meaningful.
Comparison with the ordinary conjunction and implication
A natural question is that of the equivalence of (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ J ζ ⊢E (F ) and the ordinary conjunction E ∧ F , and similarly for the implication. Here, F is meaningful in the same context as E, so that J ζ ⊢E (F ) does not "actually depend" on the truth of E.
In order to avoid any confusion, we recall that a dependent conjunction is always denoted (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F even if F does not actually depend on the truth of E (i.e., even if F is in the image of J ζ ⊢E ). On the contrary, of course, the ordinary conjunction is denoted E ∧ F . The same rule applies to the two kinds of implication.
For the conjunction, we have successively :
For the converse inequality, we have :
For the implication, we have successively :
and for the converse inequality :
Hence, the dependent conjunction and implication are equivalent to the ordinary conjunction and implication when their second operand does not "actually depend" on the truth of the first one.
Possibly surprising may be the fact that the usual conjunction comes as a right adjoint (and consequently is a "multiplicative" connector), whereas the dependent conjunction comes as a left adjoint (and hence is an "additive" connector). In other words, the meaning of the usual conjunction is defined in terms of its behavior when it is in the position of the conclusion, whereas the meaning of the dependent conjunction is defined in terms of its behavior when it is in the position of the hypothesis, as we saw above. A fact which can demystify this point for the reader is the similar fact that an indexed disjoint union of sets, such as x∈X Y (a notion of an additive nature, which can actually be defined through the use of a left adjoint) can be identified with the cartesian product X × Y (a notion of a multiplicative nature) when Y does not actually depend on x, which is after all just a more elaborate example than 2 + 2 + 2 = 3 × 2.
However, we can temperate the mysterious aspect of this by remarking that the ordinary conjunction as a right adjoint is a binary operation, whereas the dependant conjunction is by no way a binary operation. It looks much like a declarative operation, i.e. it constructs expressions containing a declaration and a "body" which is the scope of this declaration.
There are many such declarative operations in mathematics, for example :
(where E is the body). So, the dependant conjunction is a quite different operation than the ordinary conjunction. As a conclusion, we are maybe troubled by the fact that the two conjunctions have the same name (which is nevertheless justified by what we proved above).
The fact that the conjunction should preferably be considered as a left adjoint (or an additive connector) rather than a right adjoint (or a multiplicative connector) could have been (but actually was not) suggested in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, which is a definition of the meaning of the logical connectors in terms of proofs, says that :
• a proof of E ∧ F is a pair (p, q) where p is a proof of E and q a proof of F ,
• a proof of E ∨ F is a pair (i, p) where i is either 0 or 1, and p a proof of E if i = 0 and a proof of F if i = 1,
• a proof of E ⇒ F is a method( 23 ) producing a proof of F from a proof of E,
• a proof of ∀ x∈X E is a method producing a proof of E from any x in X,
• a proof of ∃ x∈X E is a pair (x, p) where x is an element of X, and p a proof of E.
As one can see, additive connectors are those for which a proof is a pair, whereas multiplicative connectors are those for which a proof is a method, provided that the conjunction is considered as an additive connector. However, it should be remarked that pairs which are proofs of E ∨ F and ∃ x∈X E are clearly "dependent pairs", in the sens that the statement proved by the second component of the pair depends on the value of the first component, and it is certain that, despite the fact that they were necessarily aware of this dependency, the early intuitionnists always considered pairs which are proofs of a conjunction as "ordinary pairs". In the work of Gentzen, there is also no mention of a dependent conjunction. The reason for this could be that for some reason, these mathematicians were not much concerned by the principle of description (see section 6), or equivalently, but maybe more accurately, that they did not take into account in their models of reasonning the fact that the definition of a mathematical object can depend on the truth of a statement.
From types to sets
The definition given in section 3 of the dependent conjunction and implication provides a clear explanation of another phenomenon that we now explain.
The authors of this article were working on a compiler for a typed system similar to those familiar to topos theorists, such as the type theory one can find in Lambek and Scott [4] , but with a type constructor W (taking a statement as its unique operand) with the meaning that data of type W (E) are "warrantors" of E, i.e. objects which "warrant" the truth of E.( 24 ) At the "low level" of this system, the declaration following a quantifier has the form x : T where T is a type (not a set !), and where the symbol : plays a role similar to ∈, but means "is of type" instead of "belongs to". In this system, sets are defined as data whose type has the form P(T ), where the type constructor P is of course a syntactic version of the power object functor of topos theory. More precisely, a datum of type P(T ) is called a "set hosted by T ". We also say that T is the "host" of X.
At the "high level" of the system, types are invisible and only sets are manipulated. In particular, the quantifiers have the form ∀ x∈X E and ∃ x∈X E where X is a set (not a type !). The compiler of the system must translate this high level formulation into a low level one. The formulas for this transformation are :
where T is the host of X, and where x ∈ X in the right hand members is not a declaration but a statement (whereas it is a "high level" declaration in the left hand members).
Why these definitions should be written like this is intuitively obvious. However, it is not so easy to give an explanation of why they must be written like this. This can be done as follows.
First of all, we need a definition for the high level declaration x ∈ X. It is defined as the low level declaration x : T (where T is the host of X), followed by the assumption x ∈ X.( 25 ) In other words, the high level context enrichment by (x ∈ X) must be translated into the low level "two steps" context enrichment by (x : T )(ζ ⊢ x ∈ X). Now, since the adjoint of a composition is the (reversed) composition of the adjoints, we have :
which is just the wanted explanation.
Notice that this explanation is made possible by the fact (among other things) that the dependant conjunction is defined as a left adjoint. Also notice that in the expressions ∀ x:T (x ∈ X ⇒ E) and ∃ x:T (x ∈ X ∧ E), the implication and the conjunction are obviously dependent, since E can be meaningless if x does not belong to X.
We can apply the same method to similar situations. We give just one example. Let's denote by T (T ) Γ the meta-set of all terms of type T meaningful in the context Γ.( 26 ) The meta-set T (P(T )) Γ of all expressions representing sets hosted by T is preordered by the relation of inclusion, denoted ⊂.( 27 ) We use the more precise notation ⊂ Γ in order to stress the fact that the inclusion is valid in the context Γ (which entails that both operands of ⊂ Γ are meaningful in the context Γ). We have the two "low level" maps :
and similarly, two "high level" maps by replacing x : T by the declaration x ∈ X, and P(T ) by P(X). Notice that E → {x : T | E} is left adjoint to A → x ∈ A, since :
and similarly for the high level maps. Now, we have :
again by the composition of adjoints. Since, J ζ ⊢x∈X (x ∈ A) can also be written x ∈ A, we see that the high level comprehension {x ∈ X | E} must be translated at the low level into {x : T | x ∈ X ∧ E}.
How an invisible variable can occur free in an expression
The declaration of ζ in (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F and in (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ F ( 28 ) would be useless if ζ had no free occurrence (should it be hidden) in F . Of course, we know that in usual mathematics, this ζ is not explicitly declared and not explicitly written in the expression F (which is why the phenomenon is somewhat mysterious).
Returning to our example A = ∅ ∧ inf(A) = 0 in the introduction, we want to write it as follows :
in order to make everything explicit, and in particular the fact that inf needs ζ. The purpose of this section is to explain how a free occurrence of ζ can be present (even if invisible) in the statement inf(A) = 0.
In everyday mathematics, there is a principle that we apply without being in general conscious of the fact that it is one of the key bricks of the system. This is the "principle of description", which (informally) says that if you have proved the existence and unicity of a mathematical object, then this object is well defined. In topos theory, this principle is a theorem which can be stated as follows. Given two objects X and Y in a topos, and an arrow ϕ : X × Y → Ω,( 29 ) such that the statement of the internal language ∀ x∈X ∃! y∈Y ϕ(x, y)( 30 ) is true (in the empty context), then there is one and only one arrow f : X → Y such that the statement of the internal language ∀ x∈X ϕ(x, f (x)) is true. ( 31 ) The importance of the role played in mathematics by this principle is discussed in [8] .
If we want to make everything explicit (so that mathematics look like a programming language), we introduce a so-called "description operator", taking as unique operand a proof (or more accurately a warrantor; see section 7) p of a statement of the form ∃! x∈X E, and producing an element of X (satisfying the statement E). This operator exists in every topos.( 32 ) Notice that considering a similar operator valid for any statement of the form ∃ x∈X E (i.e.
28 ζ ⊢ E is of course a kind of declaration. 29 Recall that Ω is the subobject classifier, which plays the role of an "object of truth values", similar to the usual set of booleans {true, false}, but possibly much more complicated than the booleans (and which is not necessarily a set).
30 Where as usual, ∃! means "there exists a unique". 31 It is easier to see this theorem as a version of the informal explanation above if you consider that X represents a context (instead of the domain of a function), or alternatively by putting X = 1.
32 It is essentially the arrow denoted ♯ in [8] .
without the unicity condition) would be equivalent to introduce something like a "Hilbert choice operator" (and this one doesn't exist in every topos( 33 )). Now, it is clear that the definition of the greatest lower bound of a nonempty subset of N looks like this : "the unique integer such that . . . ", in other word, it uses the principle of description, or, if we want everything to be explicit, the description operator. This is how the variable ζ has a free occurrence in inf(A), since the expression defining inf(A) necessarily has a subterm of the form δ(p) (where δ is the description operator), where p is a proof of a statement of the form ∃! x:T E, and has at least one free occurrence of ζ, since it must use ζ as an hypothesis.
In the next section, we explain why all those things are invisible.
Why a variable can be invisible
The principle of indiscernibility of proofs has important consequences for understanding the usual language of mathematics, the so-called "vernacular" of mathematics. It explains why assumptions are most often anonymous, why a mathematician can use a theorem without reading a proof of it, why proofs can be written in a somewhat lazy way, in contrast with statements and terms,( 34 ) why some formal proof constructors have no counterpart in the everyday language of mathematics, and also why the variable ζ in the dependent conjunction (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F and the dependent implication (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ F is invisible.
Proofs are a syntactic concept, i.e. they are expressions of a language, so that they are candidates to be "signifiers". As any signifier they have a corresponding signified. We call such a signified a "warrantor". But be careful, a warrantor is not just an equivalence class of proofs. The notion of warrantor can be precisely defined in topos theory,( 35 ) and it can be the case that a given warrantor is represented by no proof at all.( 36 ) However, a warrantor of a statement E always warrants that E is true (hence its name). The principle of indiscernibility of proofs is then a consequence of the principle of "the unicity of the warrantor", i.e. the fact that a given statement cannot have more than one warrantor (which is actually an easy consequence of its topos theoretic definition).
We now use a metaphor. Imagine that you are alone on a desert island. Do you think 33 A topos satisfies the "external axiom of choice" if all its objects are projective. This is stronger than the "internal axiom of choice" which says that the axiom of choice is true as a statement of the internal language. A Hilbert choice operator is even stronger than the external axiom of choice because it amounts to choose a section for every epimorphism.
34 Terms are those expressions representing mathematical objects in the usual sens. 35 A statement E meaningful in a context Γ is interpreted as an arrow ⌊E⌋ Γ from Γ (the object representing Γ) to Ω. A warrantor of E is just a section of the pullback of ⊤ : 1 → Ω along ⌊E⌋ Γ . This notion was introduced by the second author around 2007 in [10] . It would deserve rather long developments that we plan to give in another article, with particular attention to its links with the axiom of choice.
36 Which just means that in the given topos we have a true statement which is not (internally) provable.
that you need a name ? For sure, you don't. You are just "the one on the island" (of course, we know which island (which plays here the role of the statement) we are talking about). Similarly, a warrantor of a statement E, doesn't need any name. You can call it "the warrantor of E" (assuming that it exists, of course). So, what matters is not "who is a warrantor of E ?", but only "is there a warrantor of E ?". This is of course why assumptions are most often anonymous, because, as explained above, an assumption is nothing else than the declaration of a warrantor. If we have a named hypothesis such as "Assume E (ζ)." in a text, it is of course very handy to refer to it by its name ζ, but it is by no way required, because in the scope of this assumption, ζ is the name of the unique warrantor of E, who doesn't need any name because it is unique. There is even no need to refer to it in general. Remark that if we had the funny idea to assume the same statement E twice with distinct names ζ and η, it would be quite ridiculous to refer preferably to ζ instead of η. Do you think that one of these two hypotheses could be better than the other one for any (strictly mathematical) purpose ?
Similarly, a theorem can be anonymous (even if it is usual to give it the name of the first person who found a proof of it). When a mathematician uses a theorem proved in another article or book, he doesn't need to specify that in order to be suitable for the purpose of his own proof, it must have been proved in some way rather than in another. The only thing which matters is that the theorem was reliably proved at least once. Also remark that if a mathematician finds a better proof of an already proved statement (better because shorter, more conceptual, using better tools, and so on. . . ) the theorem will keep the name of the mathematician who proved it for the first time. In a sens, the name is not attributed with respect to the quality of the proof given, but only according to anteriority, that is to the insurance that the warrantor exists. Formally, the name is given to the warrantor, not to the proof.
It is a fact that proofs can be written in a lazy way, or more precisely that we don't write the proof of a theorem in the same way depending on the audience. If you write a proof for undergraduate students, you will put more details than if you write it for researchers. This just means of course that researchers have a better ability to find out the missing (or implicit) parts of the proof. In both cases, no matter how people fill theses gaps, provided that they fill them. This is again just because of the unicity of the warrantor.
Furthermore, proofs are so lazily written in general that some necessary (formal) constructs are always omitted. In other words, these constructs have no equivalent in the vernacular.
As an example, assume that p is a proof of an implication E ⇒ F (in any context), and that q is a proof of E (in the same context). Formally, a proof of F is then the applicative term p(q) (or something similar, in any case, a kind of "modus ponens operator" applied to p and q). There is nothing in the vernacular which corresponds to this p(q). We content ourself with the fact that E and E ⇒ F having become "obvious" at some point of the discourse, F is also obvious at this point. This is of course possible because we don't have to be precise on how we prove this fact, which is again a consequence of the unicity of the warrantor.
There is a mental mecanism corresponding to the possibility to "apply" p to q, but nothing to write it down. There are several other example of this phenomenon, and almost half of the formal proof language is concerned.
Summarizing, warrantors are generally omitted in the notations, and the context provides the insurance that they exist, which is enough. As a consequence, the notation inf(A) for the greatest lower bound of A makes no reference to a warrantor (or proof) of the fact that A is nonempty, so that the name ζ of the required warrantor does not appear in the notation. Since it does not appear in the notation inf(A), it is also useless to declare it in front of A = ∅. This is why, the dependent conjunction and implication are written E ∧ F and E ⇒ F in the vernacular and not (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F and (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ F . But they remain nevertheless dependent.
